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Abstract 
This thesis examines the role of outside option in wage bargaining within a complete 
information framework. A worker, after obtaining an outside offer higher than his 
current wage, initiates bargaining with his current firm over a new contract. In each 
period of bargaining, if an agreement is not reached, the worker must decide whether 
or not to opt out, and if he decides to stay, whether or not to strike in that period. 
In this study, it is shown that almost any wage level between the outside option 
and the entire revenue can be sustained in equilibrium payoffs. Our results provide 
a game theoretic explanation of phenomena such as preemptive wage increase and 
contract renegotiation (often initiated by firms). 
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1 Introduction 
A professional athlete is often requested by his club to launch the contract renego-
tiation long before the expiry date of the current contract.i What is the underlying 
force that prompts the early start? More generally, casual observation also shows 
that employers often give pay raises to their most capable employees without being 
asked. What is the main motive behind this generosity? One might come up with 
the following: it would become more costly to keep an employee after he receives 
outside offers. Prom such a point of view, the above observations should be con-
sidered as the incumbent employers' preemptions. This, however, begs for a better 
understanding of the role of outside option in wage bargaining. 
Outside option principle could be applied to explain the mechanism of the worker's 
great bargaining power brought by the outside option. The well-known "outside op-
tion principle" was first formally analyzed by Binmore, Shaked and Sutton, and it 
was later tested in a laboratory experiment by the same group (1989). Binmore, 
Shaked, and Sutton consider the alternating-offers bargaining game originated from 
Rubinstein (1982)，in which one of the parties can opt out after rejecting an offer. 
They find that the outside option principle predicts the division of the final equi-
librium outcome overwhelmingly better than the split-the-difference method. The 
outcome of the bargaining game highlights the significance of outside option, that 
is，if the outside option, say, b is lower than the equilibrium share from the game 
iln the summer of 2009, Lionel Messi, considered one of the best soccer players of his generation, 
extended his contract with the Spanish club Barcelona to 2016 with a buy-out clause of 250 million 
euros, whereas his previous contract was to expire in 2014 with a buy-out clause of 150 million 
euros. 
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without the outside option, then it has no effect on the bargaining outcome; how-
ever, if b is large, then the player with the outside option obtains b in the unique 
subgame perfect equilibrium. The intuition is that opting out is not a credible threat 
for a player if he can achieve nothing more from leaving the bargaining table than 
by staying. By resorting to the outside option principle, we still cannot provide a 
satisfactory explanation for the preemptive actions because an employer always has 
the option of waiting until the outside offers arrive, and then outbidding them by a 
small margin. 
An important feature of the Rubinstein bargaining game is that along the bar-
gaining process before any agreement is reached, the parties receive fixed (usually 
normalized to zero) disagreement payoffs. In the context of wage bargaining, it is 
equivalent to assuming that the union is committed to strike until the agreement 
is reached. This gives rise to a unique and efficient subgame perfect equilibrium. 
However, in reality, wage bargaining is often characterized by lengthy strike and in-
efficient delay. This motivates the study of Haller and Holden (1990) and Fernandez 
and Glazer (1991) (HHFG, hereafter). They analyze an extended Rubinstein game 
in which strike is a strategic choice of the union, and conclude that the bargaining 
game has multiple subgame perfect equilibria, some of which entail delay and strike. 2 
How would the interaction between inside option (e.g., strike) and outside option 
affect bargaining outcome? In this thesis, we find that if both strike and outside 
option are available, the worker's bargaining power would be greatly improved. The 
worker might succeed in occupying the whole revenue. Thus, by adding an outside 
2See also a further study along this line by Avery and Zemsky (1994). 
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option in the HHFG wage bargaining model, we provide a game theoretic explana-
tion for the employers' preemption. The logic is simple: while an outside option 
may enable the worker to make a credible take-it-or-leave-it offer in bargaining, a 
preemptive pay raise makes the outside option impossible and significantly reduces 
the upper bound of the equilibrium wage. 
More specifically, we develop a modified version of the HHFG bargaining model. 
As in the HHFG model, a worker can produce periodic revenue of a fixed size for his 
firm. The worker and the firm are assumed to bargain sequentially over discrete time 
and a potentially infinite horizon. The two parties have an pre-existing wage contract 
VKe. After obtaining an outside offer, the worker initiates a wage bargaining over a 
new contract. The worker and the firm alternate in making offers of wage contracts, 
which the responding party is free to accept or reject. Acceptance of a proposed 
wage concludes bargaining with a new contract. Upon either party's rejection, the 
worker must decide whether or not to opt out, and if he decides to stay in bargaining, 
whether or not to strike in that period. If the worker opts out, bargaining is over; 
from that period onwards, the worker receives his outside option and the firm receives 
nothing. If the worker stays and strikes, both parties receive nothing in that period, 
but bargaining continues. Finally, if the worker chooses to stay and not to strike, he 
receives the pre-existing wage, the firm receives the residual revenue, and bargaining 
continues. Correspondingly, the outside option exists forever. 
We first show that if the outside option is higher than the current wage, and both 
the worker and the firm are sufficiently patient, then almost any wage level between 
the outside option and the entire revenue can be sustained in a subgame perfect 
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equilibrium. The multiple equilibria are constructed by forming an expectation cycle. 
More specifically, if the worker has a credible threat to opt out after his current 
demand is rejected, he will demand the entire revenue, which will be accepted by the 
firm. Starting from there, using backward induction, we can establish a decreasing 
sequence of wage expectations: while expecting that the two parties will agree upon 
a certain wage greater than the outside option in the next period, the worker will not 
opt out or strike, which in turn implies that he is willing to settle for a lower wage 
in the current period. When the wage expectation approaches the outside option, it 
eventually becomes optimal again to opt out after a rejection, which gives the worker 
the overwhelming bargaining power to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. This closes 
the cycle of wage expectations, and every wage level on the cycle can be sustained 
in an efficient subgame perfect equilibrium. 
Based on the cycle, we get multiple equilibria when the worker makes propos-
als. The equilibria then extends from discrete ones to continuum ones using the 
extreme punishment strategies in which the one who deviates will get punished. The 
worker's equilibria payoffs could range between the wage slightly above the outside 
option and the entire revenue, when both the worker and the firm are sufficiently 
patient. Hence, by raising the wage slightly above the possible outside option before 
its arrival, the upper bound of the equilibrium wage in the forthcoming wage rene-
gotiation is significantly reduced. This provides the incentive for the employers to 
give preemptive pay raises, which helps avoid competition from other employers. As 
Schwartz and Wen (2006) prove, the worker always accepts the temporary increase 
in compensation offered by management. In contract, we do not explictly model the 
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firm's preemptive strategies in this thesis. However, our results indicate the possi-
bility that management unilaterally increases the wage during contract negotiation 
before the outside option arrives. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the most 
closely related literature. In Section 3，we outline the model. Section 4 characterizes 
the subgame perfect equilibria of the bargaining game and discusses the implications 
of our results. Section 5 further compares our model with that of HHFG and Shaked 
(1994), analyzes the influence of discount factor's different value on the equilibrium 
of the bargaining game, and considers possible extensions of our analysis. Section 6 
concludes. 
2 Literature Review 
Rubinstein (1982) shows that two bargainers will always reach an immediate agree-
ment in a unique equilibrium under a complete information framework, A large body 
of literature has evolved to explain the inefficient bargaining delay often observed 
in real life. Early research mainly focused on the case with information asymmetry 
between players, where delay serves as a signaling device. 
Haller and Holden (1990) and Fernandez and Glazer (1991) analyze wage bar-
gaining within a complete information framework. They show that a large range of 
wage levels can be sustained in an equilibrium with immediate agreement, and, based 
on this multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes, they further construct equilibrium with 
delay and strike. 
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Strike in reality is regarded as one kind of money burning. Money burning is used 
as a strategic choice by one player to destroy surplus during bargaining and therefore 
serves to enhance his bargaining power. Avery and Zemsky (1994) synthesize the 
multiplicity results from complete information bargaining with money burning, that 
is, multiple equilibria arise when at least one player can destroy some bargaining 
value after his own proposal is rejected. 
In this thesis, we mainly analyze the wage bargaining with strike (inside option) 
and outside option within a complete information framework. Our model is most 
closely related to HHFG and Shaked (1994) models. 
2.1 Wage Bargaining and Strike 
The phenomenon of striking exists out of the conventional bargaining theory frame-
work. It is regarded as a wasteful mechanism to distribute gains from trade. To ex-
plain the existence of strikes, asymmetric information is first introduced. Rubinstein 
(1985)，and Grossman and Perry (1986)，among many others, develop the theory of 
asymmetric information. They regard strikes, or delays in reaching agreement, as a 
signal device of the firm's lower profits which allows a lower wage agreement to be 
reached. 
However, Haller and Holden (1990) and Fernandez and Glazer (1991) find ineffi-
cient equilibria with strikes under complete information for both parties. Haller and 
Holden (1990) extend the Rubinstein model and show the equilibria with strikes for 
a length of real time. Fernandez and Glazer (1991) further explain the model, in 
which a union and a firm carry on wage contract negotiation as a sequential bar-
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gaining process. During bargaining, the union could decide, in each period, whether 
to strike or not for the duration of that period. There exist Pareto-efficient equilib-
ria. However, there also exist several subgame-perfect equilibria in which the union 
engages in several periods of strikes prior to reaching an agreement, although both 
parties are completely rational and fully informed. They show that the union could 
gain more with striking in disrupted periods than in continuous periods. This could 
be explained by the first mover advantage initiating asymmetric costs to both parties. 
The basic equilibrium strategy is that any attempt by one of the parties to deviate 
results in an efficient equilibrium, but one which adversely affects the deviating party. 
They show that strikes can occur in real time, and discuss extensions of the model, 
such as lockouts and the possibility of multiple reconstructing opportunities. 
2.2 Outside Option 
Strike is usually considered as a strategic choice for the worker to improve his bar-
gaining power. Aside from strike as an inside option, outside option is also a method 
for the worker to improve his bargaining power with the firm. 
Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton (1989) carry out an experiment on bargaining with 
outside option. The players go through the Rubinstein-type game with outside op-
tion. In the game, the player can only opt out when he responds to the other. Thus, 
a unique equilibrium exists. Their conclusion shows that deal-me-out (outside op-
tion) predicts the bargaining outcome overwhelmingly better than split-the-difference 
(half-half split of the remaining part). They also predict that outside option will be 
irrelevant to the final deal unless the player with outside option would go elsewhere. 
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Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) classify the bargaining game with outside option 
into two cases: the player can opt out when responding to an offer and he can opt 
out when his offer is rejected. They give out the corresponding equilibria. 
Shaked (1994) investigates the type of alternating offers bargaining games in 
which one player could opt out each time his offer is rejected. There exist a continuum 
of equilibria for this type of bargaining, unlike the one in which a player could opt 
out when responding to an offer. When the outside option is sufficiently large or 
sufficiently small, the model has a unique equilibrium; if the outside option is within 
an intermediate range, there are multiple equilibria. These equilibria do not vanish 
and shrink to a Walrasion equilibrium when the frictions in the negotiation procedure 
disappear. Shaked also models a market with bargaining and matching along the 
so-called "Hi Tech" lines. In this model, outside option is endogenously determined. 
Manzini and Snower (2002) identify two sources of bargaining power for the firm: 
those with its incumbent employees and those with new job seekers. In contrast, 
we probe the bargaining power on the worker's side. The outsider's influence flows 
through the outside option. 
In the standard Rubinstein model with two-sided outside options, Ponsati and 
Sakovics (1998) show that there exist a continuum of subgame perfect equilibrium 
outcomes, including some with significant delay. However, in our model only the 
worker has both inside and outside options. 
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3 The Model Setting 
We consider the wage bargaining between a worker and his employer, referred to 
as the firm. There are an infinite number of time periods, and in each period, the 
worker can produce one unit of revenue for the firm. The two parties have an pre-
existing contract that specifies the current wage We E (0，1). The worker has also 
obtained an outside option of 6 G (0,1), and hence, initiates a wage renegotiation 
with the current employer. In the present study, we can simply view the worker's 
outside option 6 as a wage offer from another employer who poses no deadline on the 
offer. We suppose that the firm does not seek a replacement if the worker opts out 
or strikes. 
Bargaining over a new contract follows the alternating-offers procedure. More 
specifically, at the beginning of each odd-numbered (even-numbered respectively) 
period t, the worker (the firm respectively) proposes a wage contract Xf. The other 
party then decides whether to accept or reject the proposal. If the proposal is 
accepted, bargaining is over and the new wage contract as proposed is enforced right 
away. If the proposal is rejected, the worker must choose among three options: (i) 
to opt out, (ii) to stay in bargaining and not strike in the current period, and (iii) 
to stay in bargaining and not strike. If the worker decides to opt out, bargaining is 
over, and from that period onward, the worker receives his outside option b while 
the firm receives nothing. If the worker chooses to stay and strike, both parties 
receive nothing in the current period and bargaining proceeds to the next period. 
Finally, if the worker chooses to stay and not strike, he receives the old wage Wg, 
the firm receives 1 - W e , and bargaining continues. Clearly, this is a game of perfect 
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information. The figure below illustrates the first two periods of the game. 
G a m e e n d s G a m e e n d s G a m e e n d s G a m e e n d s ！ 
( 、 1 — 、 ） 州 S t r i k e : U ” l - X : ) ( b . O ) j 
( 0 . 0 ) S t r i k e 1 
I A c c e p t O p t o u t I A c c e p t O p t o u t ( O . Q ) j 
—I. 
N o s t r i k e N o strike j 
Figure: The First Two Periods of the Game 
We assume that both the worker and the firm have linear utility functions, and 
discount their future payoffs by a common discount factor of 6 G (0,1). More pre-




where Wg = W from t to oo if an agreement on W has been reached in period t\ 
Ws = b from ^ to oo if the worker has opted out in period t; VF^  = 0 for t if there 
is a strike in period t] and Ws = We for t if there is no strike, the worker has not 
opted out, and an agreement has yet to be reached. The firm's utility is then the 




where P^ = 1 — W from 力 to oo if an agreement on W has been reached in period 
t; Ps = Q from 亡 to 00 if the worker has opted out in period Ps = 0 for t if there 
is a strike in period t] and P^ = 1- We for t if there is no strike, the worker has not 
opted out, and an agreement has yet to be reached. 
Before proceeding to the equilibrium characterization, a few remarks on the model 
are in order. First, in our model only the worker has the outside options and there 
exists a continuum of subgame perfect equilibria. With two-sided outside options, 
the proposer has the overwhelming bargaining power because he can opt out after a 
rejection, and his threat of opting out is credible because the next proposer will have 
the overwhelming bargaining power. In the context of wage bargaining, one-sided 
outside option seems to be more relevant; after all, one rarely gets fired for asking 
for a raise. 
Another crucial feature of our model is that the worker can opt out both when 
responding to an offer and after his offer is rejected by the firm. In a Rubinstein 
bargaining model with outside option, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium 
when one of the parties can opt out only when responding to an offer. However, 
if this party can also opt out after his own offer is rejected, there exist multiple 
equilibria when the outside option is within a certain range (strictly between zero 
and one). Our results rely on the feature that the worker can opt out after his offer 
is rejected, and the outside option is relevant as long as it is not below the current 
wage. 
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Finally, it is assumed that when the worker opts out, the firm receives nothing. 
This assumption is made to simplify the model. More generally, the firm may receive 
a profit of d after the worker opts out by hiring a replacement, and it is reasonable 
to assume that b d < 1. 
4 Equilibrium Analysis 
This section characterizes the subgame perfect equilibria (henceforth, equilibria) of 
the bargaining game described above. 
We consider three separate cases: bargaining when outside option is smaller 
(6 < We), equals to (6 = We) and bigger than (6 > We) the pre-existing wage, 
among which, when 6 > We is the most important case and the center of the analysis. 
We also construct an equilibrium in which the worker opts out after his proposal is 
rejected in period 1. Finally, we briefly discuss the implications of our results on 
preemptive wage increase and contract renegotiation. 
4.1 Equilibrium when b < We 
First, if the outside option is lower than the current wage, i.e., b < We, it cannot affect 
the bargaining outcomes for all discount factors, and thus, the set of the equilibrium 
outcomes coincides with that of the HHFG model. This is stated in the following 
lemma. 
Lemma 1 When b < W^ and 0 < < 1, the set of equilibria is the same as in the 
HHFG model 
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Proof. Opting out is a dominated action for the worker because the worker can 
always choose to accept the pre-existing wage We, by which his continuation payoff 
is strictly higher than that from opting out regardless of the strategy of the firm. 
Hence, the outside option will not be taken in any equilibrium. Then the set of 
equilibria coincides with that of the HHFG model. • 
4.2 Equilibrium when b = We 
When b > We, the outside option will influence the bargaining outcome in a signifi-
cant way. The key reason is that taking the outside option might be a credible threat. 
Due to several differences on equilibrium characterization, we further separate the 
analysis into two cases: (i) b = We and (ii) b > We. 
When 6 = We, the pre-existing wage We can be sustained in a stationary equilib-
rium in bargaining for all discount factors. A stationary subgame perfect equilibrium 
(henceforth, SSPE) is an equilibrium where, after any history of the bargaining game 
(independent of the time period t), the worker and the firm always make and ac-
cept the same proposals separately, which are optimal for both of them among other 
strategies (Gul, 1989). 
Lemma 2 When b = We and 0 < < 1, there exists a stationary equilibrium, in 
which the worker and the firm agree on We in the first period of bargaining. 
Proof. When b = We e^nd 0 < S < 1, there is one SSPE: the firm always offers We, 
and it is always accepted by the worker; the worker always proposes We, and it is 
always accepted by the firm. This is because, currently, the worker will get the same 
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wage We by either opting out or staying in the firm, if he rejects it. Thus, the worker 
accepts it anyway. Given that the worker and the firm have the same continuation 
actions, the worker is indifferent between acceptance and rejection. If the worker 
deviates by asking for more than We, the firm will reject it. Thus, it is optimal for 
the worker not to opt out, because he can get the same by opting out and working 
under the original wage W .^^  • 
An opting out threat can force the firm to give up the whole revenue to the 
worker. This gives out the maximum value 1 and the minimum value We for the 
bargaining wage when 6 = We and 0 < < 1. With the boundaries of the bargaining 
wage, the following proposition can be established. 
Proposition 1 When b = We and 0 < 5 < 1, any W* e [We, 1] can be sustained in 
an equilibria with an immediate agreement on W*. 
Proof. If the outside option b = We, the worker can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer 
W = 1, that is, following a rejection, the worker opts out. For all discount factors, 
the threat of opting out is credible if the worker's deviation leads to the continuation 
equilibrium with an immediate agreement on We. 
The worker and the firm will agree on an immediate agreement W*. If the worker 
deviates, he will get punished by resorting to an SSPE, in which the worker is always 
offered We and always accepts. If the firm deviates, the worker will work under the 
pre-existing wage We. In the next period, the worker will demand for = 1 by 
threating to opt out if rejected. • 
3 It is the same as in the HHFG model. 
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An outside offer merely equals to the current wage {b = We) gives the worker an 
overwhelming bargaining power. However, opting out is a weakly dominated action. 
This diminishes the plausibility of the above equilibrium. 
4.3 Equilibrium when b > We 
Next we consider the case with b > Wg- The value of discount factor 5 matters in 
this case. Lemma 3，Proposition 2，and Proposition 3 establish when S is sufficiently 
close to 1，that is, both the worker and the firm are sufficiently patient. It will 
be discussed in Discussion section that the equilibrium outcomes for the bargaining 
game depend on different discount factor value, whether both the worker and the 
firm are patient or not. 
As the following lemma shows, no SSPE exists when b > We and 5 is sufficiently 
close to 1. Clearly, when the worker can choose to opt out in every period, We 
cannot be sustained in equilibrium. This fact upsets the only stationary equilibrium 
as described in the previous case. 
Lemma 3 When b > We and 5 is sufficiently close to 1, no SSPE exists. 
Proof. Suppose there is an SSPE. Then there is either (i) an immediate agreement 
on W* > b or (ii) an immediate agreement on W* = b or (iii) no agreement at all. 
(i) If the SSPE is an immediate agreement on W* > b, the worker should accept 
because the stationary equilibrium requires that the worker gets the same wage offer 
in the next period. If the firm deviates off the equilibrium path, the worker will 
reject it. Following the rejection, the worker will neither opt out nor strike because 
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he will get the same offer in the next period in a stationary equilibrium in either 
way. Opting out is not an optimal choice for the worker when he is pacient. Strike is 
costly for the worker and it does not affect continuation payoff. Without the threat 
of opting out and strike, the firm has no incentive to offer greater than b. This 
contradicts the assumption that W* > b. 
(ii) If the SSPE is an immediate agreement on W* = b, the worker will get the 
same if he works with W* = b oi opt out with outside option b. Thus, the worker 
has the incentive to threat to opt out asking for an offer greater than b. Then, the 
stationary equilibrium is not valid. 
(iii) If there is no agreement as equilibrium, the worker always opts out. Then if 
he does so, he will reject any wage less than 1. In this case, no SSPE exists. 
Thus, no SSPE exists when b > We and S is sufficiently close to 1. • 
Therefore, we anticipate that this bargaining model's possible equilibrium is non-
stationary when b > We and 5 is sufficiently close to 1. Now, we construct an 
equilibrium in which the parties take different actions in different bargaining periods 
and their actions exhibit a cyclic pattern. In the following, we analyze the detailed 
strategies of the worker and the firm in each period. The worker and the firm 
alternate to propose as the worker's wage. 
First, we suppose that sometime in the future, say, period T, it is the worker's 
turn to make a proposal and opting out is taken as a credible threat. Before he 
opts out and ends the game, the worker will demand a take-it-or-leave-it offer, i.e., 
the whole revenue from the firm, and leave the firm nothing. Considering that the 
worker threatens to opt out if the firm rejects his offer, it will accept the offer given 
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that it is about to receive zero anyway. 
When the firm knows that the worker will ask for the whole revenue 1 in the next 
period T, it would offer 6 + {l-5)We >bm period T - 1，when S is sufficiently close 
to 1. The reasons are as follows: 
After rearrangement, 
{l-6)We + S = We + 6{l-We). 
Since the firm knows that the worker will get 1 in the next period T, it would offer 
the most it can give to the worker and guarantee the worker would also like to accept 
such an offer. Additionally, as the worker could get an outside option b > We, the 
firm will be left with nothing. Thus, the worker will not strike in equilibrium and 
get at least We in every period during bargaining. As the worker's threat is assumed 
credible that he will opt out in period T, the worker can get We and the discounted 
value of the remaining part of production. We could also refer to the reasoning in 
the original Rubistein model: If one player will demand a take-it-or-leave-it offer 1 
in the future, the other player will offer = 1 • J one period before. However, in our 
model, the worker can choose to work with pre-existing wage Wg- Thus, if the firm 
is going to keep the worker, it has to offer We + — W^) > 
At this period T - 1, if the firm deviates by offering less, the worker will reject 
it, but will not strike and not opt out, because he would get We this period and 1 in 
4 The same reason follows for the subsequent periods (from period T — 2 backwards). 
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the next period if he stays and works. The average payoff per period is 
(1 - 5)We Jr6 = W i > h , 
which is bigger than the outside option. 
Furthermore, we apply the backward induction for the analysis. Prom period 
r — 2 backwards, the offered wage to the worker is decreasing. The reason is the 
same as in period T - 1: For the worker, the offered wage is 
We + “ " — 1 ( 1 - We)， 
which is the combination of original wage We and the remaining part of production 
with time discounting; or for the firm, it gets 
(1 — - We) = (l-W,)-5- (T-1(1 — We). 
Backwardly, the firm decreases its offering to the worker, and the worker vice 
versa, until the point when the offered wage to the worker is going to be less than 
the worker's outside option b {Wn = We+S''{l-We) < b). This initiates the worker's 
opting out one period before the point and asking for the whole revenue as prescribed 
in the beginning. We assume this point is period 1. Then n G {2,3, •• • , T - 2} for 
the above backward induction analysis. 
For period T —2 to period 2，the worker always gets more than his outside option 
in the corresponding agreement; thus, he would not opt out in the previous period. 
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If the firm offers less, he would not opt out and not strike in the current period. 
Similarly, because 
(1 - 5)We + 1 =Wn>b, 
nG {2 ,3 , - . . , T - 2 } . 
In period 1, if it is the worker's turn to demand Wn = W e - We) < b, 
obviously the worker will not demand such a low wage. Instead, he will come up with 
the take-it-or-leave-it offer Wq = 1. If it is the firm's turn to offer Wn = We + S ' ' { l -
We) < 6，the firm are supposed to offer b to the worker. In the previous period, the 
worker will demand Wq = 1. If it is the firm's turn to offer Wn = + > b 
with the condition that W„+i = We + (^+1(1 — We) < b, it will offer Wn. In the 
previous period, the worker will demand Wq = 1. 
Thus, to this point, we complete the cycle. The connection points are that the 
worker makes the take-it-or-leave-it offer in period T and the firm makes the offer 
either b or Wn in period 1 (the next cycle). Totally, there are even numbers of periods 
for one cycle. Then let 
T = 2k* = rimax + 1, 
in which, T is the total period number and n is the index. 
In this cycle, Wn is a discrete value which equals to 
Wn = We + S ^ { l - W e ) e [ b , 1], 
n G {0,1,2, • • • , T — 1} for one cycle, and 2k* -lis the critical value, which satisfies 
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the inequality 
W2k*-2 > b> W2k*' 
For the worker and the firm's strategies in period 1，if 
the worker would not accept the offer We + (^之於i(l - We) from the firm. Obviously, 
the worker would opt out. Thus, the firm should offer b instead of 
If the firm deviates by offering less, the worker will reject it and opt out because by 
opting out, he can get 
b > = (1 - S)We + 經2於*-2， 
for he would receive We this period if he works, and W2k*-2 next period. 
For another case, if 
+严— 1 ( 1 - W e ) >6， 
is offered by the firm. If the firm deviates, the worker 
will reject the deviation and not opt out and not strike because he will get 
= ( 1 - S)We + 5W2k^-2 > b 
if he stays and works. 
In one period before (T = 2k* of the previous cycle), the worker's proposal 
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= We-]- {1 - We) for himself is less than outside option b, which is not 
rational. Then, he would come up with Wq = 1 straight away. 
Indeed, it is a credible threat that the worker will opt out immediately if the firm 
rejects his demand of the whole revenue {Wq = 1) as we assume in the beginning of 
the analysis of the cyclic equilibria. The reasons are as follows: 
In period T = 2k*, if the worker chooses to stay after the rejection of his proposal, 
he would receive a payoff of at most 
{l-6)We + Sm3x{b,W2k^-i) 
(he receiving We this period, and b or W2k*-i from next period onwards). However, 
(1 — 5)We + Sb<b] 
if b < W2k*-i, we still have 
(1 - 6)We + 5W2k^-i < b. 
Therefore, if the firm rejects the worker's demand of Wq = 1, the worker will defi-
nitely opt out. 
In the above cycle, all equilibria are established simultaneously: the worker's 
demand of Wq = 1 and the firm's acceptance is well proved as one equilibrium by 
assuming the worker will opt out if his proposal is rejected. This assumption is valid 
with the establishment of every other equilibrium in this cycle. 
Period numbers do not necessarily mean that bargaining starts from period 1. 
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With the notation of this cycle, every odd-numbered period can be a starting point 
when the worker is the proposer. Different equilibria are obtained by letting the 
game start at various odd-numbered periods of the cycle before continuing with the 
full cycle permanently.5 The intuition tells us that different equilibrium periods are 
selected and realized by the convention. 
In the first case, when + - We) < 6, the minimum equilibrium payoff 
is b. In the second case, when We + - We) > b, the minimum equilibrium 
payoff is We + 严 - 1 ( 1 — We), which is offered by the firm. 
Remark 1 The cyclic equilibrium is semi-stationary. The strategies for the worker 
and the firm do not depend on the history but on different time periods in each cycle. 
The cycles are the same. In Schwartz and Wen (2007), equilibrium payoffs depend on 
the state of the subgame. The non-stationary equilibrium characteristic distinguishes 
our model from most of other model settings which have at least one SSPE among 
multiple equilibria. For example, there is an SSPE in the original Rubinstein model 
(1982), Haller and Holden (1990) and Fernandez and Glazer (1991). 
To sum up, we have the following proposition on the discrete multiple equilibria: 
Proposition 2 When b > We and S is sufficiently close to 1, there are multiple 
equilibria. In particular, for every 
mk = ^e + - We) e [b, 1]， 
5With the notation of this cycle, they are 2，4，6，etc. periods. 
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k G {0，1，2, • •. , k* — 1}，there is an equilibrium, in which the worker and the firm 
agree on W2k in the first period of bargaining. 
We illustrate the cyclic equilibria as constructed above with an example {k* = 2). 
Table 1. The Cyclic Equilibria 
Period Proposer Proposed Wage Acceptance Threshold Opt Out Decision 
1 Worker Wq = 1 Accept only Wq Yes 
2 Firm W3 = We + - We) Reject any 2 W3 No 
3 Worker W2 = We-h S\l - We) Accept any W>W2 No 
4 Firm Wi = W^ + S(1 - W^) Reject any > l^i No 
5 Worker Wq = 1 Accept only Wq Yes 
6 Firm W3 = T^ e + - We) Reject any W > W 3 No 
7 Worker W2 = We + - We) Accept any W > W2 No 
• • • • • • • • • • • « • • • 
The third and fourth columns in Table 1 are equilibrium paths. In this example, 
as VK3 二 V^ e + 沪（1 — We) > b, the firm proposes W3, instead of b. In the odd period, 
the firm accepts any wage below the respective wage in that period. In the even 
period, the worker accepts any wage no less than the respective wage in that period. 
If the worker (the firm) deviates by demanding (offering) smaller (greater) wage, it 
is accepted. If the worker or the firm deviates in favor of himself, it will lead to 
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a rejection, after which the worker executes the corresponding opting out decision. 
If the worker does not opt out, bargaining proceeds to next period, in which they 
propose the equilibrium wage. 
In this example, the equilibrium path can start from any odd number. There 
are two different equilibria. The two equilibrium wages are Wq = 1 and W2 = 
Proposition 2 finds every discrete equilibrium payoff for the bargaining game. 
Based on proposition 2, we can extend the discrete equilibrium payoffs to the whole 
continuum between the maximum and the minimum applying extreme punishment 
strategy. 
From the cyclic equilibrium, we can identify the maximum and the minimum 
equilibrium wages for the whole game starting with the worker's demand as follows: 
W^ = 1 and 
iE^ = = We + — We)，slightly above b. 
For the subgame starting with the firm's offer, 
Wf = Wi=We + S(l-We), 
Wf - 6, if We + (52�*-i(l -We)<b and 
iZ / = = We + - We), if We + — — W^) > b. 
With these maximum and minimum values, we could construct an equilibrium as 
automata for bargaining when b > We. Extreme punishment strategies are adopted 
to realize the proof. The strategy for the worker is, when the firm deviates to offer 
less to the worker, he can propose the greatest amount to himself, that is, in any 
case he can propose (1，0) to the firm as a punishment in the bargaining game. 
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Proposition 3 When b > We and 6 is sufficiently close to 1, any W* E [W^, 1] can 
6e sustained in an equilibrium in which the worker and the firm agree on W* in the 
first period of bargaining.^ 
Proof. We use automata to illustrate the equilibrium for the whole bargaining game. 
Next Table 2 gives out the detailed strategies in different states for each party. 
Table 2. The Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Proof of Proposition 3 
� EXIT I EXIT II 
Worker Proposes W* W^, 1 
Accepts W >W* W W > 1 
Worker Opts out No No Yes 
Firm Proposes W* W Wi 
Accepts W <W* W <W W <Wi 
Worker Opts out No No No 
Transitions Go to EXIT I if Go to EXIT Go to EXIT 
worker deviates; II if firm I if worker 
go to EXIT II deviates. deviates, 
if firm deviates. 
61. This proposition is for the whole game. For the subgame starting with the firm, the maximum 
and minimum equlibrium wages are different. 
2. The proposition establishes under the condition that 6 is sufficiently large and close to 1. 
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In the above table, W is the solution of (1 — S)We + 6W = b. 
The equilibrium strategy is an immediate proposal and acceptance of W*. These 
actions are supported by the convention that a deviation will be punished by one 
of the extreme equilibria, that is, if the worker deviates, the firm will propose W in 
EXIT 1. If the firm deviates, the worker will propose 1 in EXIT 11. 
Only in state EXIT II will the worker opt out if rejected. In the other state, the 
worker will not opt out. • 
Proposition 2 gives the discrete equilibrium payoffs in a constructed cycle for 
bargaining. Proposition 3 asserts that any wage level between the maximum and the 
minimum in Proposition 2 could be realized in bargaining. 
4.4 Opting Out is an Equilibrium 
In most of other bargaining models with outside option, opting out is only used as 
a possible strategy but never carried out in equilibrium. In contrast, we find that in 
our model for all discount factors, opting out can be realized in equilibium, that is, 
rejecting an offer and getting an outside option becomes an equilibrium outcome. 
Proposition 4 There is an equilibrium in which the worker and the firm cannot 
reach an agreement and the worker opts out in the first period. 
Proof. The strategy profile for a worker opting out as an equilibrium are as follows: 
At the first period, the worker asks W = 1, The firm rejects it if and only if 
W > b. Case I: There is no deviation. The worker opts out. Case II: The worker 
deviates to offer W {1 > W > b). The worker will not strike and not opt out. In the 
next period, the firm offers W which satisfies (1 — 5)We + 5W = b, 
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For case I, the worker asks W = 1, and the firm rejects it because W = 1 > b. 
Thus the worker opts out and bargaining ends. 
For case II, the worker deviates to demand W e (1,6). The worker does not 
strike or opt out in this case, but stays and works, receiving We, because in the next 
period, the firm offers W which satisfies (1 - 6)We + 5W = b. The worker can get 
the an average payoff of (1 — in each period. It equals to outside option. 
Then the worker will not strike and not opt out in the first period. • 
4.5 Implications on Preemption and Renegotiation 
Through the analysis, the outside option clearly enhances much of the worker's 
bargaining power. The firm is supposed to realize the impact on the final bargaining 
outcome and production efficiency, and takes measures to undermine it. We expect 
the above results will shed light on the question in the introduction of this thesis. 
Bernhardt and Scoones (1993) demonstrate that a firm may offer its employees 
a wage high enough to discourage competitors from acquiring information and bid-
ding up the wage further or hiring the worker away. However, they mainly examine 
the strategic promotion and wage decisions of firms when employees may be more 
valuable to competing firms. Schwartz and Wen (2006) discuss that Sections 8(a)(3) 
and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) prohibit the management 
of a firm from unilaterally increasing the wage during contract negotiations with-
out the union's approval. While the Supreme Court considers that unilateral wage 
increases are supposed to undermine the union's authority and the collective bargain-
ing environment, Schwartz and Wen (2006) reason that unilateral wage increases will 
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interfere with the union's incentive to strike. They further show that management 
can prevent strikes because the union would always approve the temporary increase 
in compensation offered by management. 
Most of the authors above focus more on the firms' ex-ante actions and strate-
gies, e.g., preemption or promotion in fear of outside competition or inside striking. 
We have illustrated the possible equilibria with employee's rights to freely choose 
between working, striking, and opting out. Our viewpoint is opposite to the other 
authors' research we cited in explaining the existence of unilateral wage increases 
or promotion. The significant extension of equilibrium payoffs has implications on 
the phenomena of the firm's preemptive wage increase and contract renegotiation. 
We find that the wage range is extended in the worker's favor in bargaining with 
an outside option slightly above the pre-existing wage We. The upper bound of the 
equilibrium wage can be greatly reduced after preemptive wage increase and contract 
renegotiation by the firm. 
5 Discussion 
5.1 Without Outside Option (HHFG Model) 
Outside option extends the set of equilibrium wages in the worker's favor. The HHFG 
model discusses the bargaining model only with strike and without outside option. 
There are efficient multiple equilibria or delayed ones (with strikes) in the bargaining 
model. For the convenience to compare the different models, we unify the notation 
in different models. In HHFG's analysis, if We < any wage contract w such 
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that w G [We, We + (1 二e)] can be generated as an equilibrium wage contract with 
an agreement reached in the first period. After we assume that the worker can opt 
out during bargaining, the set of equilibrium wage extends. If 6 > We, the worker 
can get any wage contract w such that w E [6,1]. If 6 < Wg，the set of equilibrium 
is the same as in the HHFG model. In addition, in our bargaining game, strike is a 
possible option for the worker to choose, but it is not used in equilibrium, 
5.2 Committed to Strike (Shaked 1994) 
Usually, strike is considered as a strategic choice for the worker to improve the 
bargaining power. If the worker is committed to strike, the worker and the firm 
will get nothing before the final agreement. This is similar to the model in Shaked 
(1994)，in which the players have no fixed division over the pie before they reach an 
agreement. They mainly analyze the "Hi Tech" model that one player is permitted 
to opt out as long as one offer is rejected. There is a unique equilibrium if b < 5/2 
and 5/{2-S) <b <1 and many equilibria if 5/2 < b < 5/{2-S). The outside option 
plays a role when 6/2 < b according to the outside option principle. The number 
of equilibrium is similar to the case when one player can opt out when his offer is 
rejected, which is analyzed systematically by Osborne and Rubinstein (1990). 
In our model, the worker can choose work besides opting out and strike. When 
b < We, the set of equilibria is the same as in the HHFG model, and there are many 
equilibria. When b > We, multiple equilibria exist and outside option influence the 
equilibria differently for various discount factor values. 
The outcome difference between our model and Shaked (1994) lies in that the 
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turning point value We might be less than S/2 with great possibility in reality. This 
means much lower outside option in our model than that in Shaked (1994) will 
help increase the worker's bargaining power J Thus, working under pre-existing wage 
actually improves the worker's bargaining power more than strike when bargaining 
with outside option. The worker has a larger bargaining power when his inside option 
is larger when the outside option influence exists. This forms a paradox compared 
with the common knowledge that strike can improve the worker's bargaining power 
in any condition. This also reflects the interaction between strike and opting out in 
wage bargaining. 
5.3 The Influence of discount factor S 
The value of discount factor is quite important during the bargaining process. For 
different outside option values, we analyze the different discount factor values' influ-
ence separately. When b < We, the equilibria do not change if the discount factor 
varies. 
However, when b > Wg, the equilibria depend on the value of discount factor. 
The main difference results from the change of the critical period n when = b. 
Specifically, 
h-W. 1 
队 = W e + -We)=b=^5= 
(i) If 0 < < fE^，VFi < b. The cycle degenerates to 2 periods. The equilibrium 
is that the worker will ask for 1 and opt out if rejected, accepting any W > b] the 
firm will offer b, accepting any W, If the firm deviates, the worker will opt out and 
7Suppose the player in Shaked (1994) with outside option is the worker's role. 
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obtain 6 > (1 - S)We + 6. This equilibrium is stationary. 
(ii) If < J < 1, n increases with the increase of 5. When 6 < 0.95, n < 20. 
When 6 > 0.95, n increases abruptly with tiny increases of 5 and W^ converges in 
probability to b as 6 ^ 1, that is, the worker is sufficiently patient. The minimum 
wage for the worker is b even when the worker is the first proposer. Then as -> 1, 
it can be regarded that all range from outside option and the whole revenue can be 
sustained in equilibrium. 
(iii) Suppose it is possible that 6 = 1, the cycle collapses. The worker will ask for 
1 every period and opt out if rejected, accepting any W > b. The firm is different 
between accepting and rejecting, by both of which it obtains nothing. The firm will 
offer b, accepting any W; if the firm deviates, the worker will work under pre-existing 
wage We. As the worker will still work if the firm deviates, this equilibrium is not 
stationary. 
5.4 Equilibrium Refinement by Good Faith Bargaining Rule 
In the US, Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA (1997) makes it illegal for an firm to refuse 
to bargain in good faith about wages with a union. In many countries' labor codes, a 
bargaining in good faith stipulation is also enforced. Wen and Schwartz (2007) study 
the wage negotiation model of Haller and Holden (1990) and Fernandez and Glazer 
(1991) under the "Good Faith Bargaining" (GFB) rule. The GFB rule requires that 
the union and the firm have to (weakly) improve their proposals over time, that 
is, the offer given to the proposer himself is no more than his offer in the previous 
period. Specifically, given the worker or the firm offers {di, dj) G [0，Ip, he will offer 
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< di in the next period under GFB. 
They find that the GFB rule significantly restricts feasible strategies and conse-
quently eliminates the union's credibility to strike. The set of SPE payoffs in this 
game's subgame depend on the state of the subgame, which is non-stationary. With-
out the ability to initiate strikes, the union fails in its strategic opportunities during 
disagreement, so that there is a unique equilibrium, compared with multiple equi-
libria without the GFB rule. In this only equilibrium, the union and the firm will 
agree on the pre-existing wage contract in the first period. 
Consider our bargaining model. First, the equilibria we constructed do not satisfy 
the GFB rule because the cycle violates it. Second, we conjecture that the GFB rule 
kills all equilibria in our bargaining game. Generally, we infer that this imposes a 
paradox on the GFB policy: if no equilibrium exists for the bargaining game under 
the GFB rule, how could it be possible for the worker and the firm to bargain without 
violating it? Thus, the existence of the GFB rule might not be good. 
6 Conclusion 
We study a bargaining model which is a combination of the HHFG model and the 
Shaked (1994) model settings. The bargaining model with outside option and strike 
features new results: non-stationary multiple equilibria by constructing a bargain-
ing cycle. The cyclic equilibria are established by backward induction and based on 
the worker's future take-it-or-leave-it demand of the whole bargaining game. Con-
sequently, the threat from inside and outside options by the worker might make the 
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firm accept any wage level between a wage slightly higher than the outside option and 
the entire revenue, if both are patient enough. These two options greatly improve 
the worker's bargaining power. Apart from these equilibria, the worker's opting out 
immediately could also be realized in equilibrium. To undermine the worker's bar-
gaining power, the firm would apply strategies such as preemptive wage increase 
and contract renegotiation. Thus, we reinforce the idea in Schwartz and Wen (2006) 
and Bernhardt and Scoones (1993) that the firm tends to give the worker preemptive 
wage increase to undermine the worker's strike and opting out incentive. In contrast, 
however, our basic model setting does not allow the firm to exert special strategies 
to prevent the worker's strike or opting out. 
To discuss furthermore, we compare the model with the other two models: the 
HHFG model without outside option and the Shaked (1994) model without strike. 
We also demonstrate how the equilibrium vary with the discount factor, and reveal 
that the major conclusion in this thesis about the bargaining game depend on the 
sufficient patience of the worker and the firm. As a possible extension, the GFB 
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